Social science, epistemology, and the problem of relativism more

SOCIAL EPISTEMOLOGY, 1988, VOL. 2, NO. 3, 263-271 Symposium Social science, epistemology, and the problem of relativism I VOLKER MEJA and NICO STEHR A standpoint where the right hand does not know what the left hand is doing (this is the result of a far too pointed separation of the specialized sciences from epistemology), can only lead to the sterility of contemporary philosophy. Karl Mannheim ([1925] 1964: 364). I Central aspects ofKarl Mannheim's sociology of knowledge paradoxically fell victim to the dualism he himself had deplored. This kind of sociology of knowledge, according to the commonly accepted argument, invariably becomes entangled and then entrapped in the problem of relativism, by asserting - as a research hypothesis - a general existential connectedness of thinking. It insists that all knowledge claims are contingent and can be comprehended as sets of belief which, far from being self-evident, are in need of legitimation. One credible answer has been the claim that the sociology of knowledge is immune to the charge of relativism. The classic sociology of knowledge defensively insisted that it is quite possible to do sociology of knowledge without falling victim to relativistic contradictions. This 'resolution' of the relativism charge by the founders of the sociology of knowledge involves very different arguments, but generally converges on the view expressed for example by Werner Stark ( 1958: 152) that the 'sociology of knowledge is primarily concerned with the origin of ideas, and not with their validity'. This argument means that epistemological issues are increasingly treated in a specialized fashion and emerge as the legitimate subject of epistemology.1 We argue that this all too frequent dogmatic separation between epistemological and social scientific discourse contributes little to a solution of the relativism problem, and that this separation must therefore be overcome. /. The claim that the sociology of knowledge is inevitably relativistic if it fails to modestly confine itself to its own specialized field of inquiry can be summed up in a few paragraphs. An unconditional sociology of knowledge asserts that the 'suspicion of ideological thinking' must apply to knowledge of every kind. All thinking is bound by Authors: Volker Meja, Department of Sociology, Memorial University of Newfoundland, St. John's Newfoundland A lC 5S7, Canada: Nico Stehr, Department of Sociology, The University of Alberta, Edmonton, Alberta TG6 2H4, Canada. An earlier version of this paper appeared in Sociale Welt 36: 261-270, 1985. 264 SOCIAL SCIENCE, EPISTEMOLOGY, AND THE PROBLEM OF RELATIVISM sOC IAL SCIENCE, EPISTEMOLOGY, AND THE PROBLEM OF RELATIVISM 265 existence and therefore relative to certain social-historical contexts, i.e., it is contingent knowledge which cannot rely upon some universal standard. Critics of such a research program of the sociology of knowledge, among them Karl Mannheim, have pointed to two interrelated problems. First, there is the problem of relativism. Since the sociology of knowledge does not acknowledge ahistorical criteria of objectivity, it is in danger of giving free reign to an extreme intellectual scepticism, nihilism, and anarchism. Such a sociology of knowledge tolerates, according to critics, any form of knowledge and is in extreme cases forced to surrender solutions to conflicts to purely arbitrary decisions. Second, the critics emphasize the problem of the self-refutation of an unrestricted program of the sociology of knowledge. Since its thesis of the context-dependency of all knowledge must also apply to the sociology of knowledge itself, the sociology of knowledge makes a general truth claim which it at once denies (e.g., von Schelting 1934: 99; Bergmann [1951] 1968: 132-133; Nagel: 500; Merton 197 1: 196; Lukes 1977: 137). Ernst Griinwald (1934: 2 19) was one of the first critics to spell out this charge in his Das Problem einer So;:;iologie des Wissens. An unconditional sociology of knowledge, according to Griinwald, will invalidate itself as contradictory, since 'the thesis that all thinking is connected to existence and therefore cannot be true, asserts its own truth' (compare Mannheim [ 1924] 1964: 302-303). The criticism of self-refutation, advanced in similar fashion ever since Plato, is the most typical and apparently powerful objection to relativism (e.g., Rickert 1915: 309-3 10). It is attractively elegant as well as persuasive, as the almost infinite repetitions of this argument in the past decades all too clearly demonstrate. Moreover, it cannot be refuted without difficulties, especially since this critique of the sociology of knowledge is primarily one of its logical argumentation.2 In other words, the charge of relativism and the thesis of self-refutation are intended as indications of fundamental logical fallacies in the argumentation of the sociology of knowledge. It soon becomes evident, however, that the critique is not restricted to this alone. It is, therefore, important to point to a differentiation between logical (or epistemological) and existential relativism. In an unpublished manuscript, Mannheim distinguishes, in an analogous fashion, between logical and existential relationism.3 Logical relationism makes assertions about assertions. Its intention, therefore, is primarily meta-theoretical, whereas existential relationism is concerned with actually existing, i.e., empirical objects.4 This distinction is important because the debate about relativism, while claiming to address formal or logical systems of assertions, in fact rarely achieves its goal and instead continually discusses the alleged existential consequences of logical positions. illustrated by a few concrete examples. Each of these examples addresses alleged intellectual and socio-political consequences of relativism, which advocates of the 'tenet of a complete lack of standards and orderliness' apparently consciously wish for or must put up with, since these consequences are seen as an unavoidable (existential) consequence of relativistic assumptions. Helmut Schoeck (196 1: 89), for example, asserts that social scientists, especially in their discussions of social inequality, frequently are attracted to relativism: 'a social scientist will often go on the most imaginative and longest detour if it helps him to avoid a fact that might make it more difficult for him to view stratification as a wholly relative and accidental phenomenon' (author's emphasis). 'Relativism' is conflated here with chance occurrence, disorder, non-determination, and non-structuration. Frank Hartung (1952) argues that a commitment to cultural relativism robs us of every conceivable rational foundation for a decent life. I. C.Jarvie ( 1975: 349) adds to the list of consequences: 'Relativism is a simple and beguiling doctrine that encourages laziness and nihilism'. (Author's emphasis, see also, I. C. Jarvie, 1984: 83) . The history of the debate on relativism indicates clearly that the often extraordinari­ ly hostile reaction to relativistic arguments frequently relies on and appeals to an indiscriminating combination of arguments which emphasize that relativism leads to moral decay and undermines rational discourse in science.6 Such criticism includes in particular the interchangeable use of such terms as subjectivism, arbitrariness, irrationalism, and relativism (compare Mauthner [19 10/ll] 1980: 309; Collins and Cox 1976: 424) 7 Yet by alleging the interchangeability of the functions of relativism, the critics of relativism claim that they have succeeded in making a strictly empirical observation about the societal consequences of relativistic positions, comparable ultimately in its force to the claim that a relativistic position displays all the characteristics of logical self-refutation.8 Ill. I1. The relativism debate has until now been closely associated with a dualistic (cf. Barnes and Bloor 1982: 25-28) 5 and hierarchical conception of forms of discourse which, while quite consistently applied by the critics of an unrestricted sociology of knowledge to the theses which they reject, is rarely self-reflectively applied to their own propositions. The form of their own critique thereby, however, calls into question the alleged primacy and distinctiveness of logical objections to an unconditional sociology of knowledge. Our thesis of the - possibly even unavoidable - intermixture of forms of discourse, as is evident even among the critics of the sociology of knowledge, can be best The prevailing interpretation of the nature of relativism tends to attribute to relativism the assertion that all knowledge claims and intellectual conceptions are equivalent, if only in their inability to ascribe special status to a single claim. Similarly, the opponents of relativism assume that an infinite number of knowledge claims is possible in practice.9 This transposition of logical assertions to the level of the actual history of human cognition, perhaps formally indisputable, remains unopposed or unrefuted merely because empirical or substantive arguments against this thesis are usually rejected a priori as unjustified. The critic of relativism is thus permitted to argue asymmetrically, to deduce certain existential consequences from logical objections against relativism. These existential deductions are not themselves subjected to or even seen as in need of empirical analysis. But precisely such examination would permit a more convincing evaluation of the social and intellectual consequences which are said to result from challenging the logical validity of relativism.10 It is quite evident that virtually all assessments of the social consequences of relativism are tainted by the alleged detrimental effects of relativism on the social fabric of society. It is of course not only logically possible to reflect on the possible beneficial social consequences of relativism but it may well be sensible to do so for other reasons, e.g., out of concern for the political and intellectual goals of a collectivity. An epistemology which argues in an absolutist or dogmatic manner1 1 - and this is not surprising - is little interested in a 266 SOCIAL SCIENCE, EPISTEMOLOGY, AND THE PROBLEM OF RELATIVISM SOCIAL SCIENCE, EPISTEMOLOGY, AND THE PROBLEM OF RELATIVISM 267 sociological and anthropological critique of knowledge, and consequently neither acknowledges that theories of knowledge presuppose moral principles nor that the realization of these theories crucially depends upon certain general societal conditions that make themselves felt within the scientific community. An important theoretical argument, with evident empirical implications, against the claim of the inherent social and intellectual consequences of an unconditional sociology of knowledge (or relativism) may be formulated by closely following Chomsky's reflections on the range and diversity of human language. This substantive argument shows particularly well that certain logical objections against a general sociology of knowledge cannot be applied without grave difficulties at the level of credible existential argumentation. One of the fundamental theses of Chomsky's linguistics derives from his observation that human languages are in some respects not as diverse as they theoretically could be. There is consequently only a limited diversity of human languages. Moreoever, all languages have significant mutualities, certain universal attributes related to their syntax or, more precisely, to the hierarchical arrangement of sentences. These rules are constitutive for language and without them linguistic communication would not be possible. Chomsky claims that these universal attributes are the result of innate abilities. Chomsky's conclusion remains controversial. What is not controversial, however, is his fundamental empirical observation that the actually existing human languages are not the result of chance events, i.e., are not an arbitrary collection of logically possible permutations and combinations of symbols. The diversity of human languages is subject to practical limitations. Unlimited variety, by contrast, would imply that possible transformations and innovations are infinite and, in the final analysis, more or less arbitrarily produced. And this corresponds exactly to the picture of multiple and unlimited knowledge claims, ideas, theories, world-views, ideologies, symbols, theoretical conceptions, and so on, which critics see associated with or even as flowing from a sociology of knowledge which aspires to examine all forms of knowledge. But this clearly absurd idea paradoxically presupposes in practice precisely those anarchistic societal conditions which it warns against in the first place when it objects to the alleged social and intellectual consequence of relativism. The logic of the argument not only represents a reversal of the elementary sociology of knowledge thesis about the link between ideas and social structure but declares, on the basis of purely logical possibility, everything as knowable that presupposes that the isolated individual is the ultimate knowing subject (cp. Apel 1972) . The theory of society implicitly assumed by the critique of relativism is reductionist. It does not accept the reality that there are social limits of knowledge which are established and sanctioned by society and subject to historical change. In analogy to Chomsky's theses, without however necessarily accepting Chomsky's claim that biological factors limit the diversity of syntax in human languages, it may be asserted that knowledge claims, while variegated, are not as variegated as they are in theory. If such inherent existential limitations on the diversity of knowledge claims are accepted, the argument of critics that certain logical deficiencies of relativism have decisive existential consequences loses much of its intellectual appeal and authority. In other words, the traditional critique of the sociology of knowledge not only greatly overestimates the danger of an unfettered expansion of knowledge and of ideological positions, but at the same time underestimates the dangers implicit in a monopoly on discourse. 12 However, a more securely based sociological position is, as Mannheim ( [ 1925] 1952: 148) already noted, that 'different intellectual currents do not proceed in splendid isolation but mutually affect and enrich one another, and yet do not merge into one common system but try to account_for the totality of the discovered facts, each starting from different general axioms'. In analogy to the sociological and anthropological critique of extreme relativism, which we have discussed, it may also be concluded that the thesis of a radical incompatibility of knowledge claims, theories and paradigms, language games, and the assumption of a radical 'variation in meaning' of concepts - in so far as they refer to actual knowledge processes - is difficult to maintain. Thus, the frequently asserted dualism 'dogmatism or extreme relativism' is itself dogmatic, since it is hardly reasonable to proclaim a radical discontinuity of different forms of existence and aspects of life: It seems more appropriate to compare the various forms of life to th� fibres of a co�d, as Wittge? stein did in a different context. The various fibres overlap, but there IS no thread With the functiOn of connecting all the individual fibres. At times, the fibres touch, but there is no basic fibre, such as . . . reason, or spirit, or whatever other concept one m1ght want to c1te, 1deas treated w1th such awe by philosophers (Duerr 1985: 102) The idea of a socially 'restricted' relativism (sozial gebremster Relativismus) appears to be a more realistic conception than the idea of a radical relativism based, in the final analysis, on an unconditionally reductionist or solipsistic foundation. At the same time the free flow of a wide range of ideas is potentially extremely endangered and certainly cannot be simply taken for granted, especially since it is the elimination of diversity that is frequently the dominant political objective of scientific theories and political programs. 13 The so-called self-refutation thesis, we think, is indefensible. It rests on the assumption that there is a direct relationship between the validity of knowledge and the social context, i.e., that knowledge that can be shown to be existentially bound is no longer valid knowledge. When Griinwald and others argue, for example against Mannheim, that existence-connected thinking cannot claim to be true, the resulting self-refutation thesis is only valid if it is simultaneously supposed that 'connectedness to existence' is identical with falseness, and non-connectedness to existence identical with truth, or that it is at least a necessary precondition for truthful assertions. The self-refutation thesis is distinguished by a lack of sociological self-reflection; although logically perhaps incontestable, it nevertheless rests on problematic theoretical . assumptwns. 14 IV The relativism debate demonstrates that an adequate epistemology must not be separated from the social sciences and from ethics (cf. Stehr 198 1) .15 While the sociology of knowledge is unlikely, as many of its critics have repeatedly demanded (e.g., Horkheimer 1930: 38; Sa1omon 194 7: 350-364; Riischmeyer 1958: 4; Lieber 1965: 82-83; Neusiiss 1968: 26; Lenk 196 1: 3 13), to become a foundational science, it can nevertheless function as an interlocutor for epistemological discourse, in spite of the fact that a strict separation of concepts in general scientific theory and individual scientific fields is frequently regarded as a presupposition for meaningful scientific work. The relations between both forms of discourse need not be as one-sided as is 268 SOCIAL SCIENCE, EPISTEMOLOGY, AND THE PROBLEM OF RELATIVISM OF RELATIVISM OGY, AND THE PROBLEM SOCIAL SCIENCE, EPISTEMOL 269 comm�n�y assumed Once scientific knowledge is recognized for what in the final : . . analysrs It IS- a social enterpnse whose criteria for demarcation and whose goals they h �v: b�en formulated in epistemology, are both socially contingent constrammg m specific circumstances - the mutual advantages of a JOimng of 1 . . . ep�stemo og�cal �nd social scientific discourse become increasingly evident. Once epistemologica� discourse, h_owever, �akes note of social conditions and possibilities, it . too can be subJeCted to soCial-scientific critique. �:� · · · · Notes I. Historically, epistemology (Erkenntnistheorie) emerged in the first a 2. 3· 4. 5. 6. 7. 8 · f h p�st century a�d gra�ually . assumed a separate identity within philosophy (cf. Kiihnke 1986·· 5 · s m any �peC!ahzed science, Its boundaries became more and more distinct. More re�entIy however, the preemmence of discourse . aiming at exclusion has it seems ' given waY t0 a sof1temng o f mtellectual restrictions . . ( Popper' 1970· 459-360) n i phy of scientific knowledge is aiso partly based t on this ssum tion: 'Kuh � p es the acceptatiOn of a fs e common framework. He suggests that rationality depend p n u e h � a u i u :sts that rational discussio� and rat onal cri i n s ss I s a w ldely accepted and mdeed a fashiOnable thesis: the thesis of e na e e �sis egard the t hes1s as m1staken' relativism. And it is a logical th . : . . Mannhe1m uses this term in a draft of h'�� Handzv..orte buch con �nbutiOn, Wissenssoziologie' see . ( , . Mannheim 1931). As in well-known Mannhe�m � c� ltJCs ave not tire� of �onstantly asserting that the , concept of 'relationism' su ested b' ai � t : 8 16 s 8 ; . n .. In the debates about relativism, furthermore, a distinction is frequently made between cognztzve and moral relativism. Steven Lukes ( 1977· 154-174)� fco xampIe, argues that moral relativism is largely , unproblematic in the sense of'o�e can't ( e o t s ), hile he sh�rply rejec�s every cognitive relativism 'the philosophical thesis that u a d l ( e a wa�s relat�ve to particular systems of thought or language', [Lukes 1977: !57]). Bloor (1981 , ho �ever, Is convmced that one very well can . adopt the same scientific attitude towards moral and cogmt1ve re!atJVIsm (see also Hollis and Lukes 1982a). In his more recent essays on relativism f · Io d' t.s pears t? take a some�hat � a milder, less unco�promising stance b ad a g ( C.Jarv �e 1984, 1986. 52) nonetheless contmues to rely on a strictly dualistic not' of d'rr ·1 werent c asses of knowledge cIaims, IOn . . namely on those which are in some sense true and oth h h e elude� o? the basis of the same calculus. Jarvie therefore continues to support Wern a 's .. ) convictiOns about truth, that . . . 'each society has its own system of knowled e which is � lt, but b yond t�ese ) separate tr�ths (plural) there must also be n integral t i c hey are a contamed , . and reconciled . By the same token critical theorists hemoa? the possible lack of clear-cut boundaries, . ' for 'the concept of ideology can be fruitful on!Y I It IS no longer employed in . . . a vague, 'f . . all -compre hensive sense, without an analysis of concrete determJ�ants, on the one hand, and of the problem of inherent truth and falsity on the other. The theory of Ideology is possible only if one can ' concretely show that a given ideology is inherently �r ng a If one can concretely show the functions their very wrongness fulfills in our society If the c a r n u ° e � re so iol�gical sp?ciality, it i� most imp�rtant t f e th 55 53 n � . s ' . . �con at10n of logical and ex1stentjal assertions dis la s erhaps best, as oppone.nts of relativism now· begm to appreciate (e.g., Jarvie 1984: 79), that purel 0 c l arguments �re rarely If ever s:lf-propelling . h appeal to logic alone IS msufficient to assure or self- legitimating in concrete situations and confl'c bility and the form of criticism of relativ'Ism ypica Y exemplifies this well. credi . · Collins and Cox 1976.· 424) thus emphas1ze that , much of the resonan ee wh' h theJr defcence [against ( IC . relati:is�] enjoys is- derived from the understandable moral revulsiOn engendered by the too easy . . . associatiOn of relativism with subiective anarchY and 1rrat10na11sm' " . . . . . . · Many cntIcs of relativism endeavour to make assertions about the social ongms of and the social or . . psychological functions of the attraction for relat' l h' h ar clearly a?d paradox�cally indebted to l . t�e sociology of knowledge. This too indicates q t ll hat t e relativism debate IS never merely a . dispute about purely cognitive rocesses· T o a �ples IDI��t suffice here: Heinrich Rickert 1915: 313) ( claims rather vaguely that 'rel tivism th ra g t constru �tions in the l . history of philosophy. It is psychologic�it comp eh e p uc a time w h1ch does not . . . dare to confront the problem of truth because 1 c 1s mstmct lvely that every senous proposal c a 't tee tOr . . . · c solutJon transcends Its own fashionable opinions, and theretore IS eager to declare that th'IS problem m . . f:act does not exist'. Karl Popper ([1945] 1962. 381) ofiiers a d'Ifferen� sociOlogical account: 'The social . situation of our time . . . [is] influenced to a large extent by the declme of authoritarian religion. This ��� � l J � :���:�� ��; ;�� ;��;����� � ��:�� r: �� :� : � /� � �� ;:��:�: ��: f� 1 �::� �:� ;� ��� � ���: :;: � ;� · � : ��;� ���� ���� i;;t���� ����: ��f ��;!�� )�1�7i;�J !; �=:�� �:� w�� J��� ;��: ���r �� ;� � ���� �; � ) ;� � , / 0::� :�� ;�; :: �!::Of��;� ? : :r: ;; �� ;�;�(��;���� ������ � '(�;� � ;� · · belief in nihilism, to the decline of all beliefs, even the decline has led to a widespread relativism and in ourselves'. human reason, and thus (and sed fear that support for relativism amounts to 9. Nothing else can be meant by the often expres ding nite, namely unchecked, proliferation of conten provides the conditions for possibility of). an infi es an tion or discrimination among contenders becom claims and the concomitant belief that any arbitra impossibility. d in the particular ds on the frame of reference which is applie I 0. What is deemed to be possible depen or physical ility of logical events differ from those for social circumstance; the conditions for the possib n to be economically or politically possible in a happe events or, to be even more specific for those which Daele 1986). ( given socio-economic context see also van den truth conditions, le from error because there are non-relative !I. For example, 'truth is distinguishab 1977: 165 ). ways of justifying claims to such objectivity' (Lukes non-relative principles of reasoning and y st opponents of relativism. They typically portra the severe 12. Totalitarian political systems are among the occasion the annual essay competition of offered on relativism in a vulgar manner. The explanations ility of Causes ofPhilosophical Relativism and thePossib thePrussian Academy of Science in 1936 - 'The en [1941] 1955: ( le to the 'destructive' effect of relativism see Thyss Its Transcendence' - refers for examp xiv). g dialogue, not ( d Rorty 1979: 377) when he argues that ongoin 13. One therefore can only agree with Richar of edifying philosophy is to keep the goal of an adequate theory of science: 'the point silence, must be the zation truth'. From the point of view of the social organi conversation going rather than to find objective t to the program of the critics of relativism may amoun of science, the implementation of the s strongly. te social conditions mitigate against such vision institutionalization of silence although concre futation of an unconditional sociology of of the alleged self-re !4. Mary Hesse (1980: 42) deals with the charge form of this argument goes as follows: Let P be the knowledge in the following manner: 'The usual to be true e to a local culture; hence nothing can be known proposition "All criteria of truth are relativ ed as also relative to that culture". Now if Pis assert are except in senses of 'knowledge' and 'truth' that to a local culture (in this case ours). Hence e" relative true, it must itself be true only in the sense of"tru futation ntally for asserting its contrary). This easy self-re there are no grounds for asserting P (or, incide , "truth", and cation in the cognitive terminology"knowledge" is fallacious, for it depends on an equivo in ology as relative to a local culture is presupposed "grounds". If a redefinition of cognitive termin nition. 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